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Case No. 20090478-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW GRAHAM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for felony terroristic threat and felony
domestic violence in the presence of a child. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that "a unit of government" under the
felony subsection of the terroristic threat statute includes the Utah County Sheriffs
Office and similar law enforcement agencies?
Standard of Review. "[A] district court's interpretation of a statutory provision
is a question of law that. .. [is] review [ed] for correctness." Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. of
Ariz. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, H 7,158 P.3d 1121.

2. Does sufficient evidence establish that Defendant "used a dangerous
weapon" under the felony subsection of domestic violence in the presence of a child
statute?
Standard of Review. On appeal, the "evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it" are viewed in "the light most favorable" to the jury
verdict. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 | 36, 152 P.3d 321 (citations omitted). A jury's
verdict will be reversed only when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt" as to Defendant's guilt. Id. (citations omitted). See also State v. Johnson, 2009
UT App 382, f 16, 224 P.3d 720 ("so long as some evidence and reasonable
inferences support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
Defendant was convicted of felony terroristic threat under Utah Code Ann. §
76~5-107(l)(b)(i) (West 2004); subsection (l)(b)(ii) of the same statute is a
misdemeanor:
(1) A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any
offense involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage,
and:
(b) he acts with intent to:
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(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to
influence or affect the conduct of a government or a unit of
government; [or]
(ii) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer
agency organized to deal with emergencies.
Id. (Add. A).]
Defendant was also convicted of felony domestic violence in the presence of a
child under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1(2)(b) (West 2009); subsection (2)(c) of that
statute is a misdemeanor:
(2) A person is guilty of [domestic violence in the presence of a child] if
the person:
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or
uses a dangerous weapon . . . or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in
the presence of a child; or
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection [(2)(b)], commits an act of domestic violence in the
presence of a child.
Id. (Add. A).2

1

Like Defendant, the State cites to the 2004 version of the terroristic threat
statute in effect at the time of Defendant's crimes. In 2010, the statute was
renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.3 (West 2010). See Add. A (2004 & 2010
versions of terroristic threat statute).
The State cites to the 2009 version of the domestic violence statute because it
has not changed since Defendant's crimes, although its title has since changed.

-3-

STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant was charged with terroristic threat, a second degree felony, in
violation of section 76-5-107(l)(b)(i); domestic violence in the presence of a child, a
third degree felony, in violation of section 76-5-109.1(2)(b); and aggravated assault
(domestic violence), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5103 & 77-36-1 (West 2004) (R. 1-2). An amended information added aggravated
kidnapping (domestic violence), a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-5-302 & 77-36-1 (West 2004), as an alternative charge to aggravated
assault (R. 46-45). Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over on
the amended information (R. 49).
A jury trial was held in 2009 (R. 397; R. 507-11). At the conclusion of the
State's case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on all counts (R509:
155). In connection with the terroristic threat charge, Defendant claimed that "a unit
of government" in subsection 76-5-107(1) (b)(i) does not include law enforcement
agencies (R509:155-61). The trial court denied the motion (R509:165-68) (Add. B).
The court also denied the motion on the other charges (R509:172-73,177-78 & 183).
The jury convicted Defendant of felony terroristic threat and felony domestic
violence in the presence of a child, and acquitted him of the remaining charges (R.
459-58). Defendant moved to arrest judgment on the domestic violence conviction
on the ground that the evidence did not establish that Defendant "used a dangerous
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weapon" when he threatened his wife in the presence of his children (R. 462 & 468).
The trial court denied the motion (R533: 7-8) (Add. C).
On May 11, 2009, Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms of l-to-15
years imprisonment on felony terroristic threat count and O-to-5 years imprisonment
on domestic violence in the presence of a child count (R. 472-70; R533: 12-13).
Execution of the sentences was suspended and Defendant was placed on probation
upon the condition that he serve 730 days in the jail and pay the ordered fine (id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
Defendant was 'Very agitated/ 7 "volatile/' and "angry" when Utah County
Sheriff deputies arrived at his home in response to a call of domestic violence with
possible weapons (R508: 7,10 & 48-49). When the deputies knocked on the front
door, Defendant partially opened it, but kept all of his body, except for his head and
part of his shoulder, concealed behind the door (R508: 8 & 48). This caused the
deputies to think that "there was a big issue inside that house" (R508:10, 37-38 &
49). "The tension at the door was incredible" (R508: 49).
The deputies twice asked if they could enter the home; Defendant refused and
ordered them to get off his property (R508: 11-12). Deputy BJ Eckles asked if

J

Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court's rulings and the jury's ultimate determination
of guilt. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 78,100 P.3d 1177; State v. Shepherd, 1999
UT App 305,1f 2, 989 P.2d 503.
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Defendant had anything in his concealed hand (R508:13). Defendant said he did
(id.). Deputy Eckles asked if it was a weapon and Defendant replied, 'That's for me
to know and you to find out" (id.). The deputies drew their guns and held them in a
low ready position (R508: 13 & 52-53). Eckles asked if he could speak with
Defendant's wife, the reported victim (R508:14).
Defendant called upstairs and his wife Mindi walked partway down the stairs
and stopped (R508: 14-15). Deputy Eckles could see that she "had been crying
hysterically. She was shaking. Her skin color appeared ... white. She appeared to
be scared" (R508: 15). Deputy Eckles asked Mindi if she would come outside to
speak to them (R308:16). Mindi did not directly respond to the deputy, but instead
turned to Defendant. She "pled" with Defendant to allow her to speak to the
deputies outside (R508: 16). Her eyes were fixed on Defendant's concealed right
side, which caused Deputy Eckles to suspect even more that Defendant was armed
(R508: 17-18). Defendant did not respond to Mindi so that Deputy Eckles again
asked her to come outside and she again just looked at Defendant (R508: 18-19).
Mindi acted as if she was afraid to leave, so Deputy Eckles asked her if she and the
children could leave the home (R508: 19). She did not answer, but again asked
Defendant for permission. This time, Defendant agreed (R508:19-20).
Mindi and the four children walked together down the stairs and towards the
deputies at the door. The deputies could see that they were emotional, crying, and
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terrified (R508: 20-21 & 54-55). Seeing them, Deputy Jared Nelson knew "that
something has happened . . . We [didn't] know what, but we [knew] that something
ha[d] happened" (R508: 54). Mindi and the children kept their eyes fixed on
Defendant, who remained hostile and agitated (R508: 20-21). Just before they
reached the front door, Mindi and the children stopped and appeared "scared" to
pass by Defendant (R508: 55). They "veered away from" him, avoiding any eye
contract, and walked outside (R508: 22-23).
The deputies immediately ushered Mindi and the children off the property
(R508:23 & 55). Even after they reached the safety of a neighbor's house, Mindi and
the children continued to "cry hysterically" and appear terrified (R 508: 23 & 26).
Mindi tearfully told a friend, "He was going to kill me" (R510: 96). She warned the
deputies that Defendant had a gun in his hand and had another handgun, "an AR
[assault rifle], a .223 and various other weapons" in the house (R508: 25).
Defendant's growing rage
Defendant's infuriation with Mindi began in the early morning when Mindi
felt too sick to have sex (R508: 67-68). She tried to calm him, but he only got angrier.
Defendant told her that he wanted to have an affair and that she had wasted 12
years of his life (R508: 69-70).
Defendant took a shower, but was still "very upset" (R508: 71). Mindi
apologized for upsetting him and hugged him, but he remained "rigid" (R508: 72).
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Mindi felt "uneasy with the level of [Defendant's] his anger . . . [because] it was
escalating quickly, and [she] wasn't able to calm him down" (R508: 70).
Mindi feared that Defendant might target their children, so she called her
friend, Rebecca Call, to pick up the children and watch them for a few hours (R508:
73-74). When Defendant realized Mindi had called Rebecca, he sternly told her,
"[t]he kids aren't going anywhere" (R508: 78). He or Mindi told the children to go
upstairs to the loft and Mindi followed them (R508: 79-80,187 & 195). Defendant
also went upstairs and the "situation became more desperate" (R508: 81).
Defendant angrily ordered Mindi and the children to clean the loft and said they
were "irresponsible" for not taking care of their things (R508: 80-81). He instructed
Mindi to call Rebecca back to tell her not to come to the house (R508: 81). He
threatened that it would be "bad" for Rebecca if she tried to pick up the children
(R508: 81-82).
Defendant went downstairs (R508: 83). Mindi feared that Defendant might
hurt her because she had tried to get the children out of the house (R508: 83). She
went into the couple's bedroom near the loft and sent a text message to Rebecca:
"When I'm gone, please fight for custody of my kids. I want you to have them"
(R508: 83-85,88,140; R510: 92 & 100-01). Five to ten minutes later, Mindi telephoned
Rebecca and whispered," [A]re you on your way?" (R510:102). Mindi then said, "I
got to go. He's coming" and hung up (id.).
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Rebecca began driving towards the home (id.). She also called a friend at the
sheriffs office, who told her a deputy would be sent to the area (R510: 103).
Meanwhile, Mindi packed a change of clothes and some medicine in a backpack
(R508: 86-87). She then wrote a note to her children telling them she loved them
(R508: 87-88 & 90).
Mindi did not know exactly where Defendant was, but she knew he was still
in the house (R508: 87). She hoped that Rebecca would hurry and get the children,
so that whatever happened, the children would not be involved (id.). She feared
that Defendant was going to seriously harm her because he had previously
threatened to "hurt [her] and dispose of [her] body" (R508: 89). Mindi thought,
"this might be the day that he actually hurts me" (R508: 88). She went back into the
loft as Defendant walked upstairs (R508: 91).
Defendant entered the loft. When he did, their eleven-year-old daughter,
Madilyn, retreated into a corner and fearfully held onto her two-year-old sister,
while their six-year-old brother stood near them (R508: 91-92). Nine-year-old
Merrick stood near his mother, who turned to face Defendant (id.). Terrified, Mindi
saw that Defendant had a .45 caliber handgun holstered on his belt (R508: 92-93,95
& 100). In their entire marriage, Defendant had never previously armed himself in
the middle of an argument (R508: 94).
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Defendant again demanded that Mindi call Rebecca and tell her not to come
over (R508: 93-94). Mindi tried to convince him that the children should leave, but
Defendant threatened, "[t]ell her not to come or I will shoot her/7 (R508: 94).
Defendant was furious: "his face [was] very h a r d , . . . his nostrils [were] flarefd], "
and his jaw clenched (id.). He was "very tense, very adamant" that Rebecca should
not come over (id.). Mindi called Rebecca and begged her not to come over, but
Rebecca said she was just a few minutes away (R508: 95).4
"[A]t that point [Mindi] had resigned [herself] to the fact that that might be
the day that [she] died" (R508: 96). She did not want her husband to shoot her in
front of their children, but she felt trapped because Defendant was armed (R508: 9697 & 102). She feared that if she called the police, Defendant would retaliate because
he felt that police officers were "the enemy" and "terrorists" (R508:101).
She sent a desperate text message to Ryan McMurtrey, her LDS bishop:
"Please help me" (R507:183; R508: 85 & 97). McMurtrey saw the message, but did
not recognize the telephone identification number. He called the number back and
Mindi answered in a whisper (R507:183-84; R508:100). Mindi said that Defendant
had ordered her "to kill herself and the children or that her husband would" (R507:
184-85). She told McMurtrey that Defendant "had his guns" and she was "scared"
4

Rebecca testified that she continued to drive to the house because she did
not believe Defendant's threat (R510: 95). But her friend at the sheriffs office
convinced her not to go to the home (id.).
-10-

(R508: 100). McMurtrey asked if she was in immediate danger, and Mindi said,
" Yes" (R507:186). Suddenly, Mindi said "I've got to go. He is coming" and hung up
(R507:186).
McMurtrey immediately called 911 (R507:186). He told the dispatcher that
Defendant had military experience and owned several weapons (R507:188).
Defendant came back into the loft carrying Mindi's packed backpack, which
he had found in the bedroom. He was "furious" and threw the pack (R508: 102).
His voice became loader and "his physical actions became more erratic . . . [and]
'animated 7 " (R508:103). Defendant repeatedly told the children that their mother
was going to kill herself and "quit on them" (R508:104). The children began crying
and Mindi assured them she was not going to commit suicide (R508:105 & 107). But
all the while, she knew Defendant "wanted [her] dead. He wanted [her] to die"
(R508:105).
Just then, the deputies arrived (R508: 108). When Defendant realized the
police were there, he turned to Mindi and said, "[H]ere we go" (R508: 109).
Defendant walked downstairs to the front door (R508:110). He was still armed and
Mindi begged, "Please don't do this" (R508: 111). Defendant said, "[T]his is what
you wanted" and opened the front door (id.). She expected gunfire at any moment
(R508:110).
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The Children's

Perspective

Madilyn and Merrick knew their father was "angry" at their mother. Their
mother was "sobbing, bawling [and] very sad" (R508:187-89,199, & 207).
Madilyn had previously seen her father carry a gun, but she had never seen
him armed when arguing with her mother (R508: 94, 194 & 197). Madilyn first
realized that her father had a gun when she left the loft to get her two-year-old
sister, who had wandered downstairs (R508: 187-88). She saw her father pacing
back and forth downstairs with a gun holstered in his belt (R508: 188 & 196).
Defendant followed Madilyn as she returned with her sister to the loft. Madilyn
and her sister retreated to the corner (R508: 91). With his gun openly holstered on
his belt, Defendant told the children that Mindi "was going to go away for a little
bit" and he read them her note (R508:188). Madilyn thought her father "looked as
angry as he did whenever he would whip us with the belt" (R508: 188-89). He
repeated several times, "I'm going to do it;" Mindi tearfully "begged him not to"
(R508:189-90).
Madilyn was "terrified" at what "the future might bring" her (R508: 193).
Once she reached safety, she broke down sobbing (R508:195-96).
Merrick was also "scared" by his father's anger at his mother (R508: 205).
Merrick first realized his parents were arguing when his "dad started yelling at my
mom" in the loft (R508: 204-05). The nine-year-old was very upset when his father
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said that their mother was going to leave them (R508: 206). Merrick saw that his
father had two guns - a "Smith & Wesson 1911 and his Kelvic" — holstered in his
belt (R508: 206).
The Standoff with Police
When Defendant met the deputies at the front door, he held the .45 caliber
handgun in his hand, but hid his hand behind his back (R508:113). The .38 caliber
handgun was holstered on his belt (R508: 117 & 208). Despite the deputies'
presence, Mindi"was afraid that [Defendant] would shut the door and pull the gun
in our direction" (R508:116). She "did not believe he would shoot [the] children,
but [she] did believe that he would use it on [her]" (R508:119). She kept her eyes on
Defendant's concealed hand 3s she and the children walked out of the house (R508:
116). She described it as "the scariest walk of [her] life" (R508: 115).
Deputy Nelson remained at the front door until Mindi and the children were
safely off the property (R508: 55). He then began to slowly back away {id).
Defendant walked onto the front porch with his right hand still concealed behind
his back and told Deputy Nelson to get off the property (R508: 55-56). Defendant
was so angry and threatening that Deputy Nelson retreated to a neighbor's yard
until the SWAT team arrived (R. 508: 56-57 & 62).
Defendant's actions threatened the safety of the neighborhood (R509: 23). A
perimeter was set up to keep citizens out of the area and a nearby school was locked
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down (R.509:46 & 102). Some 40 to 50 personnel were called to the scene, including
more deputies and other officers from surrounding cities, a SWAT team, a hostage
negotiation team, and medical personnel (R. 509: 38 & 46).
The standoff lasted roughly four hours (R509:102,104 & 144). Throughout,
Defendant repeatedly attempted to bargain for no criminal charges and for law
enforcement to leave (R509:141 & 144).
While waiting for the SWAT and negotiation teams to arrive, Chief Sheriffs
Deputy Neil Castleberry spoke with Defendant by telephone (R509:15-16). Deputy
Castleberry explained that his goal was to keep the community and Defendant safe
and that he wanted Defendant to come peacefully out of the house (R509: 16).
Defendant told Castleberry that he intended to remain in the home and that he had
the "training and the means" to "neutralize [any] threat" from the police (R509:1718). From their discussion, Deputy Castleberry concluded that Defendant had "the
mental capacity and .. . the weapons and that he had the ability and was willing to
carry out those threats" (R509: 48).
The situation rapidly escalated (R509: 102-03 & 111). The deputies learned
that Defendant had possible military sniper training and might have post-traumatic
stress disorder (R509: 114-15). The negotiators had still not arrived, but a SWAT
officer with a sniper military background telephoned Defendant in an attempt to
calm him by talking about their similar military experiences (R509:103 & 111). The
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officer spoke with Defendant five to six times over the course of an hour (R509:104).
Defendant repeatedly said he had sniper training and threatened the deputies and
officers if they did not leave (R509:105-07). Ultimately, Defendant said he wanted a
letter guaranteeing that he would not face criminal charges (R509:108). Defendant
said, "[D]o it right now. Or else" (R509:111-12).
Finally, a County Sheriffs negotiator arrived (R509: 139-40). In several
telephone conversations with the negotiator, Defendant continued to demand that
the officers leave (R509: 141). Defendant also continued to refuse to surrender
without a guarantee that he would not be charged and that none of the officers
would enter his home (R509: 142-43). After the negotiator arrived, the standoff
continued for another two-and-a-half to three hours (R509:144).
As a last resort, the negotiator read Defendant a phony letter stating that
Defendant would not be charged (R509: 124 & 145-47). Defendant then said he
would put his weapons away (R509:147). The negotiator heard what sounded like
ammunition magazines being ejected before Defendant surrendered (R509:148-49).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Terroristic Threat Conviction: Section 76-5-107(1 )(b)(i) penalizes as a felony,
threats of violence aimed at "influencing] or affectfing] the conduct of a
government or a unit of government/' Subsection (l)(b)(ii) of the same statute
penalizes as a misdemeanor, threats intended to "cause action of any nature by an
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official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies." Defendant
concedes that he committed terroristic threat, but claims he committed only
misdemeanor and not felony terroristic threat. He claims that the County Sheriffs
Office is not "a unit of government" — as required for felony conviction—but only an
"official. . . agency organized to deal with emergencies" under the misdemeanor
provision. He asserts that any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved in his
favor.
The trial court correctly rejected Defendant's interpretation of the terroristic
threat statute. The legislature's use of the disjunctive in "government or a unit of
government" reflects its intent to extend the scope of the felony provision beyond
whole governments to governmental agencies and departments. Likewise, the
legislature's enactment of two different subsections with two different penalties —
felony punishment for threats against governmental agencies and misdemeanor
punishment for threats against official and volunteer emergency agencies —
demonstrates an intent to distinguish those subsections.
As the trial court correctly concluded, the Sheriff's Office is "a unit of
government." The Sheriff is an elected official who operates independent of, but in
concert with, county government. But even if the Sheriff were not an elected
official, his office and similar law enforcement agencies are not merely agencies
"organized to deal with emergencies." Rather, law enforcement agencies have a
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myriad of both emergency and non-emergency functions. And because they have
multiple functions, threats that affect them have a greater impact. Consequently,
such threats are treated more severely than threats against agencies whose only
purpose is emergency response.
Domestic Violence with Weapon Conviction: Defendant concedes that he
possessed a dangerous weapon when he threatened his wife in the presence of his
children, but claims he did not "use" a weapon. The claim ignores precedent.
Under Utah law, mere possession of a dangerous weapon constitutes "use" if
the possession intimidates or causes fear in the victim. Here, Defendant's guns —
whether holstered in his belt or held in his hand behind his back —clearly
intimidated and caused fear in his wife, as well as his children. As such, the
evidence supports Defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
UTAH COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE IS A "UNIT OF
GOVERNMENT" UNDER THE TERRORISTIC THREAT STATUTE
Defendant stands convicted of felony terroristic threat under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-107(l)(b)(i) (West 2004). At the time of Defendant's conviction, the felony
provision prohibited threats of violence committed with the intent to "influence or
affect the conduct of a government or a unit of government/ 7 See, supra, at 2-3 &
Add. A (2004 statute). A different subsection of the same statute — subsection
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(l)(b)(ii) — punishes as a misdemeanor, threats of violence committed with the intent
to "cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal
with emergencies. 5 See id.
Defendant concedes he committed a terroristic threat, but claims he did not
commit felony terroristic threat. See Br.Aplt. at 28 & 33-34. He argues that neither
the Utah County Sheriffs Office nor any other law enforcement agency is "a unit of
government 77 within the meaning of felony subsection (l)(b)(i). Instead, he claims
that law enforcement agencies are merely "agenc[ies] organized to deal with
emergencies 77 under misdemeanor subsection (l)(b)(ii). See id. The trial court
correctly rejected Defendant's interpretation of the terroristic threat statute and
correctly concluded that the Sheriffs Office and similar agencies are // unit[s] of
government 77 under subsection (l)(b)(i) (R509:165-68) (Add. B).
A.

The terroristic threat statute must be interpreted according to its
plain meaning and to avoid inoperative or superfluous terms.
"The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the true

intent and purpose of the Legislature.77 Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, ^ 13,
193 P.3d 86. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plain language of
a statute is the "best evidence of legislative intent77 and courts must assume that
//7

the legislature used each [statutory] term advisedly and in accordance with its

ordinary meaning.777 Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, If 8,52 P.3d 1276). See
5

Other variants of terroristic threat exist, but are not at issue in this case.
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also State ex rel. Z.G, 2007 UT 54, | 6,165 P.3d 1206; Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, f
13,160 P.3d 1041 (same).
When statutory language conflicts, a court's duty is to "interpret the language
[so as to] afford [ ] each provision a meaningful purpose and [to] separate[e]
convoluted statutes with a meaningful distinction. ,/ State v. Jeffnes, 2009 UT 57, ^f 9,
217 P.3d 265 (recognizing legislature intended meaningful distinction by enacting
two statutory provisions defining counterfeit and imitation substances). Courts
must consider the "literal meaning of each term" and "avoid interpretations that
will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT
38, Tf 22,212 P.3d 547 (citations omitted). See also Carter v. Univ. of Utah Medical Ctr.,
2006 UT 78, f 9,150 P.3d 467; State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ^ 19,128 P.3d 4,
ajfd, 156 P.3d 792 (Utah 2007).
As noted, Defendant concedes that he committed a terroristic threat in
violation of section 76-5-107. See Br.Aplt. at 28 & 33-34. He claims, however, that he
only violated subsection (l)(b)(ii), the misdemeanor provision, and not subsection
(l)(b)(i), the felony provision. See id. According to Defendant, the Sheriffs Office
and any law enforcement agency are merely "agenc[ies] organized to deal with
emergencies" under subsection (l)(b)(ii) and not "unit[s] of government" under
(l)(b)(i). See id. Defendant argues that the trial court, therefore, erred as a matter of
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law in denying his motion to dismiss the felony charge or in failing to reduce the
felony charge to a misdemeanor. See id. at 30. The claim lacks merit.
Defendant interprets the term "unit of government 7 ' in subsection (l)(b)(i) as
referring only to whole governments, such as cites, counties, and school districts. See
id. at 28-29. He claims that even if "unit of government" included governmental
agencies, it does not include the Sheriffs Office or other law enforcement agencies,
because such agencies are "organized to deal with emergencies." See id. at 33.
Defendant cites only civil cases in support of this interpretation. See id. at 28 n.l.
Those cases do not address the term "unit of government" in the context of the
terroristic threat statute. Nor do they hold that the Sheriffs Office or similar police
agencies are not units of government. See, e.g., Interwest Aviation v. County Bd. of
Equalization of Salt Lake County, 743 P.2d 1222,1225 (Utah 1987) (recognizing cities
and counties that levy taxes as examples of units of government); Utah Restaurant
Assoc, v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159,1161-62 (Utah 1985) (expanding
definition of "municipal ordinance" to include rules promulgated by any "unit of
government," including county board of health); Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah
560, 63 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah 1936) (holding legislature may impose probate fees for
benefit of counties, but declining to address legislature's power to "enact laws for
the purpose of raising revenue for local units of government"). In sum, these
decisions, at most, illustrate what may constitute a unit of government; they are not

-20-

determinative of the plain meaning of "unit of government" as used in subsection
(l)(b)(i) of the terroristic threat statute.
Turning to the plain language of the terroristic threat statute, subsection
(l)(b)(i) uses the terms "government" and "unit of government" disjunctively. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107(l)(b)(i) ("a government or a unit of government")
(emphasis added). In not acknowledging the disjunctive, Defendant impermissibly
equates the two terms. See Br.Aplt. at 27-38. And by equating the two terms,
Defendant renders the second term—unit of government—inoperative and
superfluous. This violates basic rules of statutory construction. See discussion,
supra at 18-19.

When statutory construction rules are properly applied, the

legislature's use of the disjunctive demonstrates its intent to extend the scope of
subsection (l)(b)(i) beyond whole governments to smaller units of government, such
as agencies and departments.
The common dictionary definition of "unit" further supports this conclusion.
"Unit" is defined as "a single thing or person or group that is a constituent and
isolable member of some more inclusive whole: a member of an aggregate that is the
least part to have clearly definable separate existence and that normally forms a
basic element of organization within the aggregate." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary at 2500 (1993). This describes the Utah County Sheriff's
Office.
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In Utah, a sheriffs office is an independent unit within the whole county
government. Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 71
Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 785 (Utah 1928) (holding that sheriff, not county commission,
has power to "summarily remover or suspend deputy"). A sheriff holds an elective
position, which is "a co-ordinate office or branch of our county government." Id. at
785.

And a sheriff generally acts independently of county commissioners in

performing his or her statutory duties. Id. The autonomy of a sheriffs office within
the broader scope of county government supports that, for the purposes of the
terroristic threat statute, a sheriffs office is a unit of government.
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's claim, a sheriff's office —like other police
departments — is not organized merely "to deal with emergencies." While it is true,
as Defendant notes, that law enforcement officers are classified as emergency
responders under the "Statewide Mutual Aid Act," Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-501 et.
seq. (West Supp. 2009), that classification is only a general description of agencies
and individuals who may be called upon to respond in an emergency. See Utah
Code Ann. § 53-2-502(4) (West Supp. 2009) (defining "emergency responders" as
persons in the public or private sector "with special skills, qualification, training,
knowledge, or experience," who would be beneficial to an emergency response and
who are requested or authorized to respond). The Act's broad description includes
not only police officers as "emergency responders," but likewise includes
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firefighters, emergency medical service workers, physicians, nurses or other public
health workers, emergency management officials, public works employees, building
inspectors, architects, engineers or other design professionals, and anyone "with
specialized equipment operations skills or training or with any other skills needed
to provide aid in a declared emergency/ 7 Id.
Moreover, while law enforcement agencies clearly have an emergency
function, they also have other non-emergency duties. For example, the Sheriffs
Office is statutorily charged with the following numerous non-emergency duties:
(1) The sheriff shall:
(a) preserve the peace;
(b) make all lawful arrests;
(c) attend ... the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals when
required . . . [and] all courts of record, and court commissioner and
referee sessions held within his county [;]
(d) upon the request of the juvenile court, aid the court in
maintaining order during hearings and transport a minor to and from .
.. designated places;
(e) attend county justice courts if the judge finds that the matter
before the court requires the sheriffs attendance for security,
transportation, and escort of jail prisoners . . . or for the custody of
jurors; . . .
(f) command the aid of . . . inhabitants of his county [;]
(g) take charge of and keep the county jail and the jail prisoners;
(h) receive and safely keep all persons committed to his custody.
. . [including] the name, age, place of birth, and description of each
person committed;
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(i) release on the record all attachments of real property when
the attachment he receives has been released or discharged;
(j) endorse on all process and notices the year, month, day, hour,
and minute of reception, and, upon payment of fees, issue a certificate
to the person delivering process or notice showing the names of the
parties, title of paper, and the time of receipt;
(k) serve all process and notices as prescribed by law;
(I) if he makes service of process or notice, certify [it] . . . or if he
fails to make service, certify the reason . . .;
(m) extinguish fires occurring in the undergrowth, trees, or
wooded areas on the public land within his county;
(n) perform as required any contracts between the county and
private contractors for management, maintenance, operation and
construction of county jails[;]
(o) [if] the sheriff of a county enters into an interlocal agreement
for law enforcement service . . . provide law enforcement service as
provided in the interlocal agreement; . . .
(q) obtain saliva DNA specimens as required . . .;
(r) . . . adopt a written policy that prohibits the stopping,
detention, or search of any person when the action is solely motivated
by considerations of race, color, ethnicity, age or gender; and
(s) perform any other duties that are required by law.
See Utah Code Ann. § 17-22-2 (West Supp. 2009). Other law enforcement agencies
also have a wide range of non-emergency obligations. See Utah Code Ann. § 53-8105 (West Supp 2009) (imposing on highway patrol non-emergency duties, such as
regulating traffic on state highways and roads; providing security at state legislative
sessions; and inspecting vehicles for road worthiness); Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-913
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(West 2004) (granting city police chiefs the "same authority as the sheriff7 within
the municipal boundaries of appointment).
Given the numerous non-emergency functions of law enforcement agencies
and their general autonomy within their respective governments, the trial court
correctly and reasonably concluded that the Utah County Sheriffs Office was "a
unit of government" under subsection (l)(b)(i), and not merely "an official . . .
agency organized to deal with emergencies" under subsection (l)(b)(ii). See Add. B
(Ruling).
The trial court's interpretation of the terroristic threat statute is also consistent
with Fourth Amendment interpretation.

In applying the search and seizure

provisions of the Fourth Amendment, courts traditionally view police officers as an
extension of the government. See State v. Royball, 2010 UT 34, f 14, 232 P.3d 1016
(recognizing Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures applies to police) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002)). Indeed, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the police and the
government are considered interchangeable. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,
f^f 10-11, 229 P.3d

650 (using terms "government"

and

"law

officers"

interchangeably in Fourth Amendment context); State v. Rowley, 2009 UT App 33, ^f
7,204 P.3d 198 (holding Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to actions by
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"'a private individual not acting as an agent of the [government'") (quoting United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,113 (1984)).
Defendant, nevertheless, asserts that a law enforcement agency should not be
considered "a unit of government" under subsection (l)(b)(i), because doing so
would increase the punishment from what was previously a misdemeanor to a
felony. See Br.Aplt. at 36. According to Defendant, before 2002 when the terroristic
threat statute was amended, a threat like the one he committed was punished only
as a misdemeanor under a provision similar to misdemeanor subsection (l)(b)(ii).
See id. (noting that 2002 amendment added "unit of government" language and
felony penalty, but that misdemeanor emergency agency provision was retained).
Defendant invites this Court to look beyond a plain reading of subsections (l)(b)(i)
and (ii) and to consider the statute's legislative history, a history that Defendant
asserts does not indicate a legislative intent to increase the punishment for terroristic
threats involving law enforcement. See id.
This Court does not look beyond the plain language of a statute, unless there
is "'ambiguity in the statute's plain language.'" State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, f
10,14 P.3d 129 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)).
Moreover, even when legislative history is appropriately considered, a court must
"'endeavor to discover the underlying legislative intent and interpret the statute
accordingly.'" Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, ^ 12, 226 P.3d 743 (quoting Jeffries,

2009 UT 57, ^[ 8). Here, as discussed, the legislature's use of the disjunctive —
" government or unit of government" — indicates a clear intent to broaden the scope
of the terroristic threat statute to more effectively preclude these types of threats.
Separately carving out threats against governmental agencies and increasing their
punishment also presumptively provides a deterrent.

Cf. Comments of

Representative Paul Ray, Floor Debate, H.B.283,54th Utah Legis. Gen. Sess. (March
5, 2002) (stating 2002 amendments "modernize" terroristic threat statute to better
deal with such threats and expands the statute to include "chemical, biological,
different types of threats that haven't been there in the past") (Add. D). Finally, the
legislative distinction in subsections (l)(b)(i) and (ii) is reasonable because threats
against governmental agencies may interfere with both emergency and nonemergency functions, while threats against emergency organizations and agencies
presumptively interfere with but one function.
In any case, absent a constitutional violation," [t]he wisdom of [a] legislative
enactment is not a legitimate concern of this Court." Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1979). A court may "not interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the legislative
scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legitimate objective." Id. at 237.
See also Burton v. Exam Ctr. Indus. & Gen. Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, ^ 12, 994
P.2d 1261 (recognizing decision to extend age discrimination prohibition to small
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employers "is a matter that the legislature, not the court, should address"); State v.
Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ^ 37, 993 P.2d 854, 865 ("we are not apt to substitute our
judgment for that of the legislature regarding the wisdom of a particular
punishment or of an entire sentencing scheme"), cert, den'd, 528 U.S. 1049 (1999); Day
v. ex re. Utah Dept of Public Safety, 1999 UT 4 6 , 1 1 36-37, 980 P.2d 1171 (recognizing
"legislative prerogatives [are] necessary to make the law responsive t o . . . changing
conditions").

Here, Defendant does not claim that his felony conviction or

punishment is unconstitutional, thus, his argument is policy-based and must yield
to legislative choice.
In sum, Defendant's actions fell within the felony terroristic threats proscribed
in felony subsection 76-5-107(1 )(b)(i). For four hours, Defendant threatened and
held at bay dozens of sheriffs deputies and other law enforcement officers (R509:
38, 46, 102, 104 & 144). He insisted over and over again that they leave, but not
before guaranteeing that he would face no criminal charges (R509: 107-08 & 144).
Defendant's threats influenced and affected the conduct of the officers by requiring
them to focus nearly exclusively on him and the safety of the neighborhood, instead
of performing their regular non-emergency duties. Designating such conduct as a
felony represents the Utah Legislature's intent to toughen Utah's terroristic threat
statute and deter threats that affect the operation of governments and their
departments and agencies.
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B.

The felony and misdemeanor provisions of the terroristic threat
statute are different and not ambiguous or redundant.
Defendant asserts that the language of sections 76-5-107(l)(b)(i) & (ii) is

ambiguous and redundant because the Legislature did not define "unit of
government" or "agency organized to deal with emergencies." Defendant claims,
"[TJhere is no significant difference between 'influencing or affecting conduct' [in
subsection (b)(i)] and 'causing action' [in subsection (b)(ii)]." See Br. Aplt. at 32-33.
According to Defendant, "[t]he only real difference between these two subsections is
the entity" involved. See id. Defendant argues that if "one entity is both a 'unit of
government 7 and an 'official agency organized to deal with emergencies 7 " — as he
asserts the Sheriffs Office and other law enforcement agencies are — that he "should
[be] . . . given the benefit of the lesser degree of offense." Id. To the extent that
Defendant is arguing that he is entitled to a lesser sentence under either the rule of
lenity or the Shondel doctrine, his claim lacks merit.
1. The rule of lenity does not apply, because the terroristic threat
statute is not ambiguous.
Under the rule of lenity, when "an ambiguous criminal statute . . . sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, [a court] should resolve the ambiguity in
favor of the more lenient punishment." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
Although Defendant does not cite the rule of lenity, he argues that he is
entitled to be convicted and sentenced only for misdemeanor terroristic threat

-29-

because subsection (l)(b)(i) is ambiguous. See Br.Aplt. at 32-33. He asserts that
language is necessarily ambiguous whenever it is reasonably capable of more than
one meaning. See Br.Aplt. at 32 (citing Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177,184 (Utah 1998)).
Evans, however, states only that an ambiguous statute should be analyzed "in its
entirety" and in harmony "with the legislative intent and purpose." See Evans, 963
P.2d at 184 (citations omitted). Here, the terroristic threat statute is not ambiguous.
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, see Br.Aplt. at 32-33, "definitional
elasticity" is not "synonymous with ambiguity." State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87, ^f 10,
152 P.3d 288. When a term is not "self-defining," extra-textual sources may be used
to provide clarification or meaning. Id. And when a reliable definition of a term can
be determined from extra-textual sources, the rule of lenity does not apply. Id.
In Bradshaw, the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply the rule of lenity in
interpreting "scheme or artifice to defraud," a term that was not statutorily defined
in the communications fraud statute. Id. at \% 8 & 17 (refusing to apply rule of
lenity, because other jurisdictions considered "scheme or artifice" as "term of art").
The same holds true here. A sheriff's office and other police agencies are "unit[s] of
government, based on a plain reading of the statute and in light of other statutes
and case law. See discussion, supra at 21-28. Consequently, no ambiguity exists and
the rule of lenity does not apply.
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2. The Shondel doctrine does not apply, because the elements of
felony and misdemeanor terroristic threats are not identical.
The Shondel doctrine requires courts to apply the lesser of two penalties only
if two statutes criminalize identical conduct. See State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67 ^f 46,
52 P.3d 1194 (citing State v. Shondel 22 Utah 2d 343, 346, 453 P.2d 146,148 (1969))
(emphasis added). Here, Defendant admits there is a difference between the
"entity" involved in subsections (l)(b)(i) and (ii). See Br.Aplt. at 33. This concession
alone defeats his Shondel argument.
Felony and misdemeanor terroristic threats also have another distinction.
Felony subsection (l)(b)(i) requires that a defendant intend to "influence or affect
the conduct" of a governmental entity. See, supra, at 2-3 & Add. A. Misdemeanor
subsection (l)(b)(ii) requires that a defendant intend to "cause action of any nature"
by an emergency agency.

See id. Although Defendant claims that these two

elements are essentially the same, see Br.Aplt. at 32-33, he does not establish that
they are identical under Shondel Nor could he. The felony subsection requires the
intent to influence the conduct or operation of a governmental agency, while the
misdemeanor subsection requires only an intent to cause the emergency
organization to act or respond. See State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98, ^ 11-12,175 P.3d
1029 (holding Shondel doctrine not applicable where elements "overlapping," but
not identical); State v. Coble, 2010 UT App 98, ^ 9, 232 P.3d 538 (holding Shondel
doctrine not applicable, because masturbation element in lewdness statute not
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identical to prurient and patently offensive element in pornography statute); and
State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, %^ 12-13, 76 P.3d 198 (holding Shondel doctrine
not applicable, because reckless driving requires three moving violations and DUI
with passenger under 16 years old requires that driver's blood alcohol exceed legal
limit).
In sum, because the elements of felony and misdemeanor terroristic threat are
different, the Shondel doctrine does apply.
II.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT DEFENDANT USED A GUN
TO COMMIT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF A
CHILD.
A defendant commits felony domestic violence in the presence of a child if he
" intentionally ... uses a dangerous w e a p o n . . . against a cohabitant, in the presence
of a child." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1(2)(b) & (3)(a) (West Supp. 2009) (Add. A). If
the circumstances do not involve use of a dangerous weapon, the defendant is
guilty only of misdemeanor domestic violence in the presence of a child. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (2) (c) & (3)(b) (Add. A)6
Defendant concedes that he committed domestic violence against Mindi, his
wife and co-habitant. See Br.Aplt. at 40 n.4. He also admits that he committed the
domestic violence in the presence of his four children and while he possessed

6

Another felony variant exists, but is not at issue here.
-32-

dangerous weapons. Id. at 40 n. 4 &5. He contends, however, that he did not "use"
the weapons he possessed, because he did not point the weapons at Mindi. In
making this argument, he attempts to distinguish pointing or exhibiting a weapon
from open possession. See Br.Aplt at 43. He claims that because he did not "use"
the dangerous weapons he possessed, he is not guilty of felony domestic violence,
but only misdemeanor domestic violence. See id. Utah precedent negates the claim.
In Utah, mere possession of a dangerous weapon during commission of a
crime constitutes "use" whenever "merely exhibiting the gun creates fear in the
victim." In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333,1335 (Utah 1979). It is "not necessary that the
State prove that the [defendant] actually pointed a gun at the victim."

Id.

(upholding aggravated robbery conviction where defendant "stuck [gun] into the
front of his jeans," but never held gun in his hand). Nor is it necessary for the State
to show that the weapon was brandished. 7 See State v. Ross, 2004 UT App 140U, *1
(upholding aggravating robbery conviction where defendant brandished knife, but
recognizing that any use that creates fear in victim sufficient for conviction).
Instead, Utah law recognizes that mere possession of a gun constitutes "use,"
whenever it "serves the possessor's purpose." State v. Willis, 2004 UT 93, ^ 11,100
P.3d 1218. "[A] weapon is used even if it is never actually pointed at a victim, so

To brandish is "to shake or wave (a weapon) menacingly." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary at 268 (1993).
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long as exhibiting the weapon creates fear in the victim/' State v. Weisberg, 2002 UT
App 434, U1f 17 & 20, 62 P.3d 457 (holding "use" established where in stalking
victim, defendant "moved a shotgun to the trunk of the care while directly in front
of [the victim's] office") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Indeed, under Utah law, a defendant need not even actually possess a
weapon to have "used" a dangerous weapon, so long as he causes the victim to
"reasonably believe" he has a weapon. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b) (West
Supp. 2009) (stating facsimile or representation of dangerous weapon sufficient if
"actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury," or "the actor
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such
an item").

Thus, a finger in a pocket pointed at a victim during a robbery

establishes "use" of a dangerous weapon. See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ^[ 2 & 10,
150 P.3d 532; State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 151, Tf 3, 91 P.3d 861.
Defendant relies, in part, on this Court's unpublished opinion in State v. Cly,
2007 UT App 212U, which upheld a felony child abuse conviction for throwing a
knife at the victim. See Br.Aplt. at 44. But that opinion provides only an example of
"use" of a dangerous weapon; it does not limit its definition. See Cly, 2007 UT App
212U,*1.
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Defendant also relies on the dictionary definition of "use" to argue that he
cannot be convicted of the felony provision unless he "put into action or service" or
"carr[ied] out a purpose or action by means of" by pointing or flashing the guns at
Mindi. See Br.Aplt at 41 & 44. Relying on State ex rel A.C., 2004 UT App 255, 97
P.3d 706, Defendant claims that the dictionary definition should apply. But A.C.
used a dictionary definition only because the term at issue was not otherwise
defined by statute or case law. Id. at f 13. Here, as discussed, Utah statute and case
law defines what constitutes use of a dangerous weapon.

And in any event,

Defendant does not acknowledge that this Court has previously refused to equate
"use" with "active employment." See Weisberg, 2002 UT App 434, |Tf 15-16 & n.2
(rejecting more restrictive federal statutory definition of "use" as "active
employment" and reaffirming that "mere possession" sufficient if it causes fear in
victim). 8
Here, the facts establish that Defendant used a dangerous weapon. During a
prolonged fit of rage at his wife Mindi, Defendant went downstairs and got two
guns (R508: 92-93,187-88 & 206). He then returned upstairs with at least one of the
guns openly exhibited on his belt (id.). While visibly armed and in the presence of

Defendant suggests that because he had a concealed carry permit and
regularly carried a gun, his actions should not be considered "use" under the R.G.B.
standard. See Br.Aplt. at 43. His legal ownership and possession do not matter,
however. What is at issue is Defendant's criminal use of the gun that caused the
victim's fear.
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his children, Defendant threatened to shoot Mindi's friend Rebecca if she tried to
remove the children from the home (R508: 93-94). This threat, as well as the other
explicit and implicit threats made that day, caused Mindi to "resign[] [herself] to the
fact that that might be the day that [she] died" (R508: 96). Mindi's fear was
sufficiently obvious that, after speaking to her over the telephone, her LDS bishop
immediately called the police (R507: 186). Mindi's children also recognized their
mother was terrified when she saw their raging father armed (R508:115,189,193,
205-06).
Mindi's fear did not dissipate when the deputies arrived (R508: 109).
Although the deputies asked her to step outside with the children, Mindi was too
terrified to leave without Defendant's express permission (R508:16,18-20 & 114-15).
And even after he gave her permission to leave, she walked out the door fearing
that Defendant would open fire (R508:119).
In sum, under Utah law, Defendant's open possession of a gun constituted
"use" of a dangerous weapon because it intimidated and frightened Mindi. 9

9

Defendant also suggests that it was error not to instruct the jury on what
constitutes "use." See Br.Aplt. at 40. This claim is not preserved in that Defendant
failed to request an instruction defining the term. See State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502,
504 (Utah 1987). In any case, for the reasons stated, the facts establish that
Defendant used a dangerous weapon.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted July 26, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

IRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addenda

Addendum A

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-107 (West 2004) Terroristic threat -Penalty
(1) A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any offense involving
bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage, and:
(a) he threatens the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section 76-10401, or threatens by the use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section
76-10-401; or
(b) he acts with intent to:
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the conduct of a
government or a unit of government;
(ii) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal
with emergencies;
(iii) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily injury,
or death; or
(iv) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or a portion of the building, a
place to which the public has access, or a facility or vehicle of public transportation operated by a common carrier.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b)(i) is a second degree felony.
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b)(iv) is a third degree felony.
(c) Any other violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person did not attempt to or was incapable of carrying out the threat.
(4) A threat under this section may be express or implied.
(5) A person who commits an offense under this section is subject to punishment for that
offense, in addition to any other offense committed, including the carrying out of the
threatened act.
(6) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any person
convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or local unit of
government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for all expenses
and losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the court states on the record the
reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-107.3 (West 2010) Threat of terrorism-Penalty
(1) A person commits a threat of terrorism if the person threatens to commit any offense
involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage, and:
(a)(i) threatens the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section 76-10401; or
(ii) threatens the use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section 7610-401; or
(b) acts with intent to:
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the conduct of a
government or a unit of government;
(ii) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or a portion of the building, a
place to which the public has access, or a facility or vehicle of public transportation
operated by a common carrier; or
(iii) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal
with emergencies.
(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b)(i) is a second degree felony.
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b)(ii) is a third degree felony.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person did not attempt to carry out or was
incapable of carrying out the threat.
(4) A threat under this section may be express or implied.
(5) A person who commits an offense under this section is subject to punishment for that
offense, in addition to any other offense committed, including the carrying out of the
threatened act.
(6) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for all expenses and
losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the court states on the record the
reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1 (West Supp. 2009) Commission of domestic
violence in the presence of a child
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as defined in Section 78B-7-102.
(b) "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1.
(c) "In the presence of a child" means:
(i) in the physical presence of a child; or
(ii) having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of domestic
violence.
(2) A person commits domestic violence in the presence of a child if the person:
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201,
against a cohabitant in the presence of a child; or
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous
weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the presence of a child; or
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child.
(3)(a) A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(c) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(4) A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a
charge of domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges
may be filed by the prosecutor.
(5) A person who commits a violation of this section when more than one child is present
is guilty of one offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child regarding each
child present when the violation occurred.
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their mother in their presence, regardless of what they did
hear or not.

He knew that they were there.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Estrada, did you want to

respond?
MS. ESTRADA:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Okay.

Again looking at the testimony of

Mindi Graham, there would appear to be some grounds, some
evidence on which the jury could find Mr. Graham committed the
offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child.
Again, Ifm not passing judgment on the weight of the
evidence.

I ! m not restricting the defense in any way from

arguing that there was insufficient evidence or walking through
the elements and pointing out what happened and what the
children saw and so forth.
any of that.

They are not precluded from doing

But that motion would likewise be denied.

Okay.

Thank you.

MS. ESTRADA:

Did the other witness appear yet?

Could we have just a moment to meet

with him and show him our exhibit?
THE COURT:
MS. ESTRADA:
of the room.

That!s fine.
I know you normally don!t take them out

If we could take that and meet with him in the

room or could we go back there and meet with him?
THE COURT:

Why donft you just meet with him up here

somewhere or back in the corner?

Okay.

We don!t eavesdrop.

How long?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

prescribed.
Ifm sorry, that was 76-6

MS. ESTRADA:
THE COURT:

—

I!m now turning to 76-5-107, the statute

on the terroristic threat.

And if we look at —

at Subsection

1(B), "A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to
commit any offence involving bodily injury, death, or
substantial property damage" —

let me know at this point as

far as that provision there is evidence on which the jury could
conclude that that occurred.
call.

That!s their call, that ! s not my

I just decide whether there is some evidence that they

could decide that from.
And go down to (B), "He acts with intent to:

One,

intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or influence or
affect the conduct of a government or unit of government."
Okay.

Let me note that the —

while there may not be

any intent here to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
there is some evidence that there may have been an attempt here
to affect the conduct of a unit of government, not necessarily
a government which would more likely be the legislative body of
government, like the legislature, the city council, some may
argue it might be a good thing to affect the conduct of the
legislature.

But, in any way, with respect to unit of

government.
Here we have the —

the Utah County Sheriff!s Office

on scene with several lieutenants, in fact one of them —
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

I

don f t know.
MR. FINCH:

Chief deputy.

THE COURT:

I don ? t know if he was at the time, at

least chief deputy.
Office there.

So you have the Utah County Sheriff's

True, they are not a policy-making body, but the

court believes that a fair statement —

a fair, and not an

unreasonable reading of the term unit of government, would
include the sherifffs office.
The Court believes that the intent of the legislature
in this case is fairly set forth unambiguously.

This is —

if

people are calling in or doing something to threaten somebody
at the police station, somebody at the schoolhouse, something
like that, to try and influence their operations,- shutdown the
school, somebody called into the Court here, for example, and
said we have, you know,

omething going on and it made us

evacuate and not hold court that day, that would certainly fall
under the statute.
Likewise, contacting the sheriff1s office, saying:
If you don f t do this, Ifm going to do this.

Or I'm —

you

know, I f m intending to do this if you don't do this, if you
donft quit fulfilling your official function to stop, to
establish the peace, which is what, in the safety of the
community, which is what the Sheriff's representatives have
said they were doing that day.
something, and I have —

We are going to start doing

we have guns, I have these abilities

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

and so forth, then it is pretty clear that there is some
evidence thereon which the jury could conclude that —

that

this type of conduct took place.
Now, with regard to the intent issue, you do have
express statements from —

from the defendant in this case to

the effect that something is going to happen, you know, if I
see these people coming forward, Ifll —
with it.

I'll take action.

would be —

you know, I'll deal

Those types of statements.

That

that would be some express evidence and direct

evidence of intent.
And then there is also some circumstantial evidence
of intent by the fact that the manner in which he is armed, he
is talking to people and, you know, telling them what he is
going to do and what he might do and so forth.
And so based on all of those things, the Court
concludes that there is some evidence on which a jury could
find a terroristic threat has occurred in the statute.
Now, the police language in the Redwood Gym case
doesn't effect us here.

Police power doesn't mean the police

department, it means the inherent power of a governmental
agency to take action, to go out and enforce zoning laws, to
take action, in other words.
Further, the argument that the police are not a
legislative body, I think I've already dealt with that.

They

do not have to be a subdivision of the state or body politic in
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

1 J order to be a unit of government.

and it ! s individuals are by any stretch of the

2 I office is by —

3 I imagination a unit of government.
4

would be denied.

5

then?

^

d M

The fact is the Sheriff's

So that particular motion

Do you want to address your other charges

^

6

::£. zriRADA:

Yes, please.

7

On the aggravated assault, I do not believe that the

8

State's provided sufficient evidence that the —

the jury could

9

reasonably conclude that Mr. Graham either intentionally caused

10

serious bodily injury or that he committed an assault as the

11

underlying precursor to the use of the dangerous weapon.

12 I

"An assault," let's see, "requires an intent with

13

unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury" —

14

been no testimony of that —

"a threat accompanied by a show of

15 I immediate force or violence to do bodily injury" —
16 I been no testimony of that —

there has

there has

"or an act committed with unlawful

17 I.force or violence that causes bodily injury to another, or
18

create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another."

And I

19 I don't believe that be there has been any act testified to today
20 I other than Mindi felt afraid.
21

THE COURT:

22

Mr. Finch?

23

MR. FINCH:

All right.

Thank you.

I think that the big issue here is the

24 J actions of Defendant and how they are reasonably construed by
25

the individuals that are seeing them and what the intent is
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

The standard in this case has

to do with whether there is substantial evidence upon which the
jury could have based its verdict.

And when the Court looks at

that, the Court has to look at the evidence in the light that
is most favorable to the finding of the jury.

We had Mindy

Graham, who I agree there may have been some debates over
credibility, but also on this particular charge there was some
corroboration from Officer Eckles, from the neighbor or the
friend that was coming to pick up the kids supposedly, and
Officer Eckles when he was at the door actually testified in
pretty fair detail what he observed and of his conversations
with Mr. Graham asking Mr. Graham if he had a weapon and
Mr. Graham saying well that's for me to know and you to find
out.
He also observed the children in a state of -- I
don't remember if he used the word hysteria, but they were
crying quite hard when they came out, at least a couple of them
were crying quite hard when they came out of the home.

And

even though the kids said they weren't crying, the officer
stated otherwise based on his observation.

The mere

brandishing of a weapon would constitute use of a weapon. And
Mrs. Graham, again, the jury credibility is solely within the
province of the jury, that's an issue solely within their
province, they evidently determined that it was unusual for him
to get up and put his guns on wearing them in holsters around
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

his waist or whatever he's doing, having them in his pant's
pocket, whatever at that point, that just wasn't something that
he did.

Now, I know the children would testify otherwise, but

again, I can't say -- I can't say the jury could believe one
and not the other in this case.
As far as the verdict being inconsistent, I can't
really say that either because the fact is there is evidence
that there was a gun out and being brandished, possibly two
handguns out and being brandished.

With regard to the threats

that were made, I don't recall Ms. Graham's ever testifying to
a specific threat like I'm going to shoot you.

However, the

types of things that she did testify to and also the
environment that Officer Eckles confronted when he came to the
door would corroborate the fact that she was in fear, that she
was placed in fear which would satisfy the assault element.
So the Court is not allowed to second guess the jury
in these situations.

Court can't find an inconsistent verdict,

and the Court can't: weigh the evidence as long as there's
evidence and in this case there was.

So the motion to arrest

judgment for new trial on the domestic violence in the presence
of a child must be den
proceed to sentencing.

h +

s point and the case must

^J^

So I have received the presentence investigation and
have reviewed it.

I have reviewed it in some detail.

I've

also gone back through the file in this case based on the
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

Addendum D

HB283
Day 44
03/05/2002
Reading Clerk:

First Substitute House Bill 283 Antiterrorism amendments, Paul
Ray.

Speaker:

Representative Ray

Representative Ray:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I'd like to move amendment number
three dated, March 4, 2002 under my name.

Speaker:

Its amendment, what's the amendment number?

Representative Ray:

Amendment number three.

(Inaudible)
Speaker:

We're going to have to find it. Representative, we don't have it
here. Can you get it on the system, amendment number three?

(Inaudible)
Speaker:

Ok. See if the circle has it. Does she have it?

Representative Ray:

Would you like for me to circle and come back to this?

Speaker:

Yes. Let me have you, you have already spoken let me have
Representative Buttars circle it for us, and then we will come back
to you as soon as we have it.

Representative Butters:

Move to circle First Substitute House Bill 283

Speaker:

The motion is that we circle First Substitute House Bill 283.
Those in favor of the motion say aye

House:

Aye

Speaker:

Oppose say no.

Speaker:

The motion passes, the bill will be circled.

Speaker, Pro tern:

Representative Ray

Representative Ray:

Speaker, Pro Tern, I move to uncirlce First Substitute House Bill
283 Antiterrorism Amendments.

Speaker, Pro tern:

Motion before us, we uncircle House Bill, First Substitute House
Bill 283. All in, any discussion to that? Seeing none, all in favor
indicate by saying aye.

House:

Aye

Speaker, Pro tern:

Opposed.

Speaker, Pro tern:

Motion passes. First Substitute House Bill 283 is before us. Let
me reset your clock, Representative Ray. You, you're on.

Representative Ray:

Thank you, I would move amendment number three dated March
4th, 2002 in my name.

Speaker, Pro tern:

We have that, would you like to discuss that?

Representative Ray:

Yes, all we are doing on this, the way the bill was written right
now, we're requiring expenses to be reimbursed to law
enforcement, a private business, organizations, anybody who is
involved in a terroristic threat for loss, or expenses and we just
added the words "losses incurred", so that we can take care of these
businesses if they have actually had to close the doors and do
without business for a day or two, they can recoup those losses also
in court. So that, that's what this amendment does.

Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. Any discussion to the amendment, amendment number
three under Representative Ray's name?

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing none. Would you like to summarize, Representative Ray?

Representative Ray:
Speaker Pro tern:

I waive.
The motion before us is that we accept amendment number three
under Representative Ray's name. All in favor indicate by saying
Aye.

House:

Aye

Speaker Pro tern:

Any opposed?

Speaker Pro Tern:

The bill as amended before us. Representative Ray.

Representative Ray:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker Pro tern. What this bill does is we're
basically modifying our criminal code, well on terrorism, we're
modernizing it, we're adding in chemical, biological, different
types of threats that haven't been there in the past. We're
exempting security plans, codes, combinations, passwords, keys
and those types of things from the GRAMA Act, so that we can
protect those and that we've taken a different term such as threat
against life or property and made that simply just a terroristic threat
based on weapons of mass destruction. We've defined what a
weapon of mass destruction is. Made some exemptions on, on
personal fire arms, so that those can't be described as that and
we've added bridges and highways as far as threats against those,
that are also in this bill. Things that we basically both since and
before 9/11 have had to worry about. This would take care of
anthrax hoaxes, bomb threats, those type of situations that are
covered. We've increased the penalty on, for instance, a bomb
threat goes from a misdemeanor to a second degree felony and just
try to put some teeth into the terrorism laws that we have. So, with
that I am open for some questions.

Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. Questions or comments for First Substitute House Bill
283.

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing none. Back to you, Representative Ray, for summation.

Representative Ray:

This is just what we need for the State of Utah. We've written a
bill specifically for Utah.

Unknown:

Daniels

Speaker Pro Tern:

Excuse me, Representative Daniels.

Representative Daniels:

Thank you. I wish to propose an amendment to the bill. And the
amendment would be to, to strike from the bill lines 95 and 96. I
would like to speak to the proposed amendment.

Speaker Pro tern:

Please.

Representative Daniels:

Thank you. This doesn't change the bill very much. I support the
general idea behind the bill. The problem that I have with this
particular lines is that it, is that it appears to make a simple assault
into a new crime of terroristic threat, the person who commits the
simple assault would still be guilty of simple assault but would also

be guilty of this crime, a terroristic threat. Let me read through how
that would read. If you start on line 85, "A person who commit, a
person commits a terroristic threat, if he threatens to commit any
offense involving bodily injury, death or substantial property
damage. So, a simple assault would be a, an offense involving
bodily injury, hit someone in the mouth for example. And then you
have to have another element, though, if you turn on the next, from
line 88 down to line 100, those are a number of different categories
that are, any one of which you need, you don't need all of them, you
just need one of them and they are all ors the're in, disjunctive and
so you get to line 95 and so, it places a person in fear of eminent
serious bodily injury or substantially bodily injury or death. So, if
you have a simple assault where some one person is placed in fear
of eminent serious bodily injury, that's a terroristic threat. It's not,
it's not punished any greater than simple assault, it is still a class B
misdemeanor, it doesn't increase the penalty. The only problem is,
it, a simple assault, you say someone, you know, I'm gonna hit you
in the mouth and you hit them in the mouth and you're convicted of
that then (Inaudible)
Speaker Pro tern:

You're time is up, Representative Daniels, would you like an
extension?

Representative Daniels:

(Inaudible)

Speaker Pro Tern:

All right, the amendment before us is to delete lines 95 and 96. I
need to clear up something, Representative Daniels turned on his
light and I did not see it when I asked Representative Ray for
summation. It was my error not his. The motion before us is that
amendment, to delete lines 95 and 96, discussion to that motion,
Representative Hutchings.

Representative Hutchings:

I would like to make a substitute motion.

Speaker Pro tern:

Substitute motion is in order.

Representative Hutchings:

On line 95, after a insert "group o f and then, delete "person" and
insert "persons" so that it would read "place group of persons" or
more appropriate may be to, "a group of people" perhaps. I don't
know what the right verbage would be, I'm going to stay with
persons "in fear of eminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily
injury or death." Just to change it from an individual person to a
group of persons.

Speaker Pro tern:

The motion before us, the substitute motion before us is to on line

95, delete the word person and insert a, after the word "a" "group of
people" and the rest of it would stay. Back to you Representative
Ray as the maker of the original motion.
Representative Ray:

I would actually oppose both of those motions, realize where they're
charging is, or where they're changing is already current statute.
My question the, the, I talked to the Attorney General about these
changes and this is really a separate bill within itself to argue the
merits of changing this, because we fear that if we do that, we pull
the carpet out from underneath the victim's rights, because we get
into current code and I don't know that we want to do that right
now. I would encourage the representatives to bring a bill back next
year to try to correct that situation, but at this point I think we really
need to stick with where the bill is going. It is still a class B
misdemeanor regardless of what you do, if it is terroristic or if it is
still a simple assault it is still a class B misdemeanor, so you're not
changing that one bit. So, I would oppose those. Thank you.

Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. Back to Representative Daniels, do you have comment
on it as maker of the original amendment.

Representative Daniels:

Thank you. It is in the original language, but it used to be called,
the crime was called threats against life or property, which isn't the
same thing, I think in modern, part of this, since the last few
months, a terroristic threat, it, Representative Ray is correct it
doesn't change the penalty, either way a person who does this is
guilty of the same degree of the offense, the only question is on the
person's record does it say he committed an assault or does it say he
committed a terroristic threat. So, I would leave it up to the body
with that. Thank you.

Speaker Pro tern:

Further discussion to the substitute motion?

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing none. Back to Representative Hutchings for summation.

Representative Hutchings:

I have just been told by counsel that I need to adjust my amendment.
Is it appropriate to do that, Mr. Speaker Pro tern?

Speaker Pro tern:

Let's hear what you'd like to do.

Representative Hutchings:

On line 94,1 would need to insert, after emergencies, "or" the word
"or" after the semicolon he says. And then the rest of the motion
would be the same. I'm sorry.

Speaker Pro tern:

So, you're just inserting the word "or" at the end of the line? I think

that just grammatically, actually it doesn't it substantively changes
it. Any discussion to the substitute motion to amend?
Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing none. Representative Hutchings, would you like to?

Representative Hutchings:

Thank you. Its, it is my understanding, speaking with the sponsor of
this, and I hope he understands that I am doing this in all best faith
of hoping to get this goes through, that we are dealing with weapons
of mass destruction and I don't know how you could limit the
weapon, using a nuclear device against an individual person and so
that's why I thought it would be more appropriate to keep it to, if
we're talking about mass destruction, keep it to groups of people,
that's the intent.

Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. The motion before us, is substitute motion, the end of
line 94, insert the word "or", on line 95 after "a" insert group of
people and delete the word "person". All in favor of the
amendment indicate by saying Aye.

House:

Aye

Speaker Pro tern:

Any opposed?

House:

No

Speaker Pro tern:

Alright, we'll rule
i the motion fails on a very weak. Let's try it again
and have everyone vote. All in favor of the substitute motion
indicate by saying Aye.

House:

Aye

Speaker Pro tern:

Any opposed?

House:

No

Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. Tl
The motion fails. We're back to Representative
Daniels, maker of the original motion to amend.

Representative Daniels:

Thank you. I would hope that you would vote for this amendment.
It doesn't hurt the bill and really just makes it a little better bill.
Thank you,

Speaker Pro tern:

The motion before us now is to delete lines 95 and 96. All in favor
of the motion indicate by saying aye.

House:

Aye

Speaker Pro tern:

Opposed?

House:

No.

Speaker Pro tern:

Motion fails. Back to the original bill, Representative, any to, further
discussion to First Substitute House Bill 283?

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing none. Back to you, Representative Ray, for summation.

Representative Ray: Again, this bill was specifically written for Utah. We didn't jump on the
band wagon with the feds and the way they took away the right of private
citizens and some of the things they did, so this is a really strong bill and I
just urge your support on it.
Speaker Pro tern:

Thank you. Voting is now open on First Substitute House Bill 283 as
amended.

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing all present. Representative Morgan, Representative Peterson.
Representative Peterson.

Speaker Pro tern:

Seeing all present and having voted, voting will be closed. First Substitute
House Bill 283 having received 69 yes votes and 1 no vote passes this
house and will be forwarded to the Senate for further action.

